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1. Introduction 
In certain multi-agent systems, the interactions between agents result in the formation of 
relationships, which can be leveraged for cooperative or collaborative activities. These 
relationships generally constrain individual-agent actions, since relationships imply that at 
least one contract (or mutual agreement) between the agents must exist. There is always some 
uncertainty as to whether or not either agent can or will satisfy some contract requirement – 
especially at the creation of a new contract. But in order to maintain the existence of a contract, 
each agent must overcome this uncertainty and assume that the other will do the same. The 
mechanism that facilitates this “act of faith” is generally regarded as “trust.” In essence, each 
agent (whether a person or organization) in a relationship mutually trusts that the loss of some 
control will result in cooperative gains that neither agent could achieve alone. 
In general, trust helps agents deal with uncertainty by reducing the complexity of 
expectations in arbitrary situations involving risk, vulnerability, or interdependence [1]. 
This is because agents rely on trust whenever they need to gauge something they cannot 
ever know precisely with reasonable time or effort. The benefits of trustworthy relationships 
include lower defensive monitoring of others, improved cooperation, improved information 
sharing, and lower levels of conflict [2]. But the reliance on trust also exposes people to 
vulnerabilities associated with betrayal, since the motivation for trust – the need to believe 
that things will behave consistently – exposes individuals to potentially undesirable 
outcomes. Thus, trust is a concept that must not only be managed, but also justified [3]. 
Since agents in an arbitrary system are always assumed to have selfish interests, the goal of 
each agent is to try to find the most fruitful relationships in a pool of potential agents [4]. 
That said, we cannot assume that agents do not already have pre-existing relationships with 
other agents. Furthermore, some agents may actually be within strongly-connected sub-
system groups known as coalitions, where every agent in the coalition has a relationship 
with every other agent in the coalition. A coalition may contain a mixture of trustworthy 
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and untrustworthy agents – but as a group, achieves cooperative gains that no sub-coalition 
could match. Thus, agents may be justified in forming relationships with coalition members 
who are not ideally trustworthy in order to acquire these cooperative gains as well. 
As a simple example to illustrate this concept, consider two geographically-separated agents 
(who never physically met) who would like to conduct a financial transaction in exchange 
for some good. One agent must provide the good (through the mail) and the other must 
provide the payment (through the mail or electronically). If both agents follow their 
economic best interest, then neither agent should participate in the transaction since both 
agents are vulnerable to betrayal. This is because neither agent can truly verify the intent 
of the other agent before they act. Thus, if a transaction takes place, it can be entirely 
attributed to trust since both agents needed to overcome the uncertainty associated with 
the transaction. Let us suppose, however, that the value of the good and the size of the 
payment are sufficiently high such that no amount of mutual trust allows a direct 
transaction to take place. To handle this situation, both agents could form a coalition with 
a mutually trusted third party, such as an escrow agent. The escrow agent would receive 
the payment from one agent to verify that the good can be shipped, and then later 
disperse the payment to the other agent (minus the escrow fee) when the good has been 
verified as received. Here, each agent benefits from the cooperative gains of the 
transaction. These gains would not be possible if even one agent chose to disband from 
the coalition. 
This chapter intends to show how one could mathematically describe these types of trust-
based interactions via the cooperative trust game to predict coalition formation and 
disbanding. It presents a rigorous treatment of coalition formation using cooperative game 
theory as the underlying mathematical framework. It is important to highlight that 
cooperative game theory is significantly different than the more widely recognized 
competitive (non-cooperative) game theory. Cooperative game theory focuses on what 
groups of self-interested agents can achieve. It is not concerned with how agents make 
choices or coordinate in coalitions, and does not assume that agents will always agree to 
follow arbitrary instructions. Rather, cooperative game theory defines games that tell how 
well a coalition can do for itself. And while the coalition is the basic modeling unit for 
coalition game, the theory supports modeling individual agent preferences without concern 
for their possible actions. As such, it is an ideal framework for modeling trust-based 
coalition formation since it can show how each agent’s trust preferences can influence a 
group’s ability to reason about trustworthiness. We refer the reader to [5] for an excellent 
primer on cooperative game theory. 
2. Classes of trust games 
This section characterizes different classes of trust games within the context of cooperative 
game theory. Our characterizations provide the necessary conditions for a coalition trust game 
to be classified into a particular class. We start with additive and constant-sum trust games, 
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which have limited value for cooperative applications, but are included for completeness. 
Then, we discuss superadditive and convex trust games, which show conditions for agents to 
form a grand coalition. In general, grand coalition solution concepts presented here can also be 
applied to smaller coalitions within a trust game through the use of a trust subgame. 
2.1. Preliminaries 
Let Γ = (ܰ, ݒ) be a coalitional trust game with transferable utility where: 
 ܰ is a finite set of agents, indexed by ݅ 
 ݒ: 2ே → ℝ associates with each coalition ܵ ⊆ ܰ a real-valued payoff ݒ(ܵ) that is 
distributed between the agents. Singleton coalitions, by definition, are assigned no 
value; i.e. ݒ(݅) = 0	∀݅ ∈ ܰ. 
The transferable utility assumption means that payoffs in a coalition may be freely 
distributed among its members. With regards to payoff value of trust between agents, this 
assumption can be interpreted as a universal means for agents to mutually share the value 
of their trustworthy relationships. Trust cultivation often requires reciprocity between two 
agents as a necessary behavior to develop trust, and a transferable utility is a convenient 
way to model the exchange for this notion. 
In defining a transferable payoff value of trust, one aspect to consider are the “goods of 
trust”. These refer to opportunities for cooperative activity, knowledge, and autonomy. In 
this chapter, we refer to these goods as trust synergy ݏ(ܵ), which is a trust-based result that 
could not be obtained independently by two or more agents. We may also interpret trust 
synergy as the value obtained by agents in a coalition as a result of being able to work 
together due to their attitudes of trust for each other. In defining a set function for trust 
synergy, it is important to explicitly show how each agent’s attitude of trustworthiness for 
every other agent in a coalition affects this synergy. In general, higher levels of trust in a 
coalition should produce higher levels of synergy. 
The payoff value of trust, however, also includes an opposing force in the form of 
vulnerability exposure, which we refer to as trust liability ݈(ܵ). Trusting involves being 
optimistic that the trustee will do something for the truster; and this optimism is what 
causes the vulnerability, since it restricts the inferences a truster makes about the likely 
actions of the trustee. However, the refusal to be vulnerable tends to undermine trust 
since it does not allow others to prove their own trustworthiness, stifling growth in trust 
synergy. Thus, we see that agents in trust-based relationships with other agents must be 
aware of the balance between the values of the trust synergy and trust liability in addition 
to their relative magnitudes. 
Let the characteristic payoff function of a trust game be the difference between the trust 
synergy and trust liability of a coalition ܵ. 
 ݒ(ܵ) = ݏ(ܵ) − ݈(ܵ) (1) 
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2.2. Additive trust game 
Additive games are considered inessential games in cooperative game theory since the value 
of the union of two disjoint coalitions ( ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ∅) is equivalent to the sum of the values of 
each coalition. 
 ݒ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) = ݒ( ଵܵ) + ݒ(ܵଶ)	∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ (2) 
We see that the total value of the trust relationships between any two disjoint coalitions 
must always be zero. In other words, the trust synergy between any two disjoint coalitions 
must always result in a value that is equal to their trust liability. Thus, by expanding this 
definition for trust games and rearranging the terms, we can characterize an additive trust 
game as: 
 ݏ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݈( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) = ݏ( ଵܵ) − ݈( ଵܵ) + ݏ(ܵଶ) − ݈(ܵଶ)  ሼ∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ: ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ∅ሽ			 
 ݏ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݏ( ଵܵ) − ݏ(ܵଶ) = ݈( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݈( ଵܵ) − ݈(ܵଶ)	 	
 ሼ∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ: ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ∅ሽ) (3) 
2.3. Constant-sum trust game 
In constant-sum games, the sum of all coalition values in ܰ remains the same, regardless of 
any outcome. 
 ݒ(ܰ) = ݒ(ܵ) + ݒ(ܰ\ܵ) = ݇	∀ܵ ⊂ ܰ (4) 
By expanding this definition for trust games and rearranging the terms, we can see that the 
constant-sum trust game is a special case of a two-coalition additive trust game involving 
every agent in the game. 
 ݏ(ܰ) − ݈(ܰ) = ݏ(ܵ) − ݈(ܵ) + ݏ(ܰ\ܵ) − ݈(ܰ\ܵ)	∀ܵ ⊂ ܰ 	
 ݏ(ܰ) − ݏ(ܵ) − ݏ(ܰ\ܵ) = ݈(ܰ) − ݈(ܵ) − ݈(ܰ\ܵ)	∀ܵ ⊂ ܰ (5) 
Definition: An agent is a dummy agent if the amount the agent contributes to any coalition is 
exactly the amount that it is able to achieve alone. 
Theorem: Γ is a constant-sum trust game implies that Γ is a zero-sum trust game. 
Proof: If Γ is a constant-sum game, the following constraint for singleton coalitions must 
always hold: 
 ݏ(ܰ) − ݏ(݅) − ݏ(ܰ\݅) = ݈(ܰ) − ݈(݅) − ݈(ܰ\݅)	∀݅ ∈ ܰ (6) 
By rearranging the terms, combining, and substituting, we get: 
 
 ݏ(ܰ) − ݈(ܰ) = ݏ(݅) − ݈(݅) + ݏ(ܰ\݅) − ݈(ܰ\݅)	∀݅ ∈ ܰ	 	
 ݒ(ܰ) = ݒ(݅) + ݒ(ܰ\݅)	∀݅ ∈ ܰ	  
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 ݒ(ܰ) = ݒ(ܰ\݅)	∀݅ ∈ ܰ (7) 
The last equation implies that every agent in ܰ must behave like a dummy agent if Γ is a 
constant-sum trust game. Since all agents behave like dummy agents and ݒ(݅) = 0 for all ݅ ∈ ܰ, then any coalition that forms in Γ will have no value. Hence, the value of the grand 
coalition is zero (i.e. ݒ(ܰ) = ݇ = 0). Therefore, the only possible constant-sum trust game is 
the zero-sum trust game. This completes the proof. 
Corollary: Γ is a zero-sum trust game if ݏ(ܵ) = ݈(ܵ)	∀ܵ ⊂ ܰ. 
Proof: If ݏ(ܵ) = ݈(ܵ)	∀ܵ ⊂ ܰ, then ݒ(ܵ) = 0	∀ܵ ⊂ ܰ. Thus, ݒ(ܰ) = ݒ(ܰ\ܵ) = ݇	∀ܵ ⊂ ܰ. This 
result in implies that every possible coalition in ܰ must behave like a coalition of dummy 
agents in a constant-sum trust game and their combinations with other coalitions will yield 
no value. Hence, the value of the grand coalition is always zero (i.e. ݒ(ܰ) = ݇ = 0). This 
completes the proof. 
Our proofs show that any constant-sum trust game is necessarily a zero-sum trust game that 
represents a special case of an additive trust game. These facts reinforce a notion that a 
group of agents who do not trust each other will always prefer to work as singleton 
coalitions. And even if there is some mutual trust between agents, gains from trust synergy 
are always lost to the trust liability, making it irrational to form any coalition with any other 
agent. Thus, if one determines that Γ is a constant-sum trust game, then this provides 
immediate justification for using non-cooperative game theory as the basis for modeling the 
purely competitive agents. 
2.4. Superadditive trust game 
In a superadditive game, the value of the union of two disjoint coalitions ( ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ∅) is 
never less than the sum of the values of each coalition. 
 ݒ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) ≥ ݒ( ଵܵ) + ݒ(ܵଶ)	∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ (8) 
This implies a monotonic increase in the value of any coalition as the coalition gets larger. 
 ܵ ⊆ ܣ ⊆ ܰ → ݒ(ܵ) ≤ ݒ(ܣ) ≤ ݒ(ܰ) (9) 
This property of superadditivity tells us that the new links that are established between the 
agents in the two disjoint coalitions are the sources of the monotonic increases. This results 
in a snowball effect that causes all agents in the game to form the grand coalition (a coalition 
containing all agents in the game) since the total value of the new trust relationships between 
any two disjoint coalitions must always be positive semi-definite. In other words, the trust 
synergy between any two disjoint coalitions must always result in a value that is at least as 
large as their combined individual trust liabilities. Thus, by expanding the definition for 
trust games and rearranging the terms, we can characterize a superadditive trust game as: 
 ݏ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݈( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) ≥ ݏ( ଵܵ) − ݈( ଵܵ) + ݏ(ܵଶ) − ݈(ܵଶ)	 		ሼ∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ: ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ∅ሽ 
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 ݏ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݏ( ଵܵ) − ݏ(ܵଶ) ≥ ݈( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݈( ଵܵ) − ݈(ܵଶ)	 	
 ሼ∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ: ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ∅ሽ (10) 
2.5. Convex trust games 
A game is convex if it is supermodular, and this trivially implies superadditivity (when ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ∅). Thus, we see that convexity is a stronger condition than superadditivity since 
the restriction that two coalitions must be disjoint no longer applies. 
 ݒ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) + ݒ( ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ) ≥ ݒ( ଵܵ) + ݒ(ܵଶ)	∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ (11) 
In convex games, the incentives of joining a coalition grow as the coalition gets larger. This 
means that the marginal contribution of each agent ݅ ∈ ܰ is non-decreasing. 
 ݒ(ܵ ∪ ݅) − ݒ(ܵ) ≤ ݒ(ܣ ∪ ݅) − ݒ(ܣ) whenever ܵ ⊂ ܣ ⊂ ܰ\݅ (12) 
Definition: A subgame ݒோ: 2ோ → ℝ, where ܴ ⊆ ܰ is not empty, is defined as ݒோ(ܵ) = ݒ(ܵ) for 
each ܵ ⊆ ܰ. In general, solution concepts that apply to a grand coalition can also apply to 
smaller coalitions in terms of a subgame. 
Definition: Given a game Γ = (ܰ, ݒ) and a coalition	ܴ ⊆ ܰ, the R-marginal game ݒோ: 2ே\ோ →ℝ is defined by ݒோ(ܵ) = ݒ(ܴ ∪ ܵ) − ݒ(ܴ) for each ܵ ⊆ ܰ\ܴ. 
Using these definitions, Branzei, Dimitrov, and Tijs proved that a game is convex if and only 
all of its marginal games are superadditive [6]. We provide their proof here as a means for 
the reader to readily justify this assertion. 
Theorem:  
A game Γ = (ܰ, ݒ) is convex if and only if for each ܴ ∈ 2ே the R-marginal game (ܰ\ܴ, ݒோ) is 
superadditive. 
Proof: Suppose (ܰ, ݒ) is convex. Let ܴ ⊆ ܰ and ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊆ ܰ\ܴ. Then: 
 ݒோ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) + ݒோ( ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ) = ݒ(ܴ ∪ ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) + ݒ(ܴ ∪ ( ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ)) − 2ݒ(ܴ)  
 = ݒ൫(ܴ ∪ ଵܵ) ∪ (ܴ ∪ ܵଶ)൯ + ݒ൫(ܴ ∪ ଵܵ) ∩ (ܴ ∪ ܵଶ)൯ − 2ݒ(ܴ) 	
 ≥ ݒ(ܴ ∪ ଵܵ) + ݒ(ܴ ∪ ܵଶ) − 2ݒ(ܴ)  
 = ൫ݒ(ܴ ∪ ଵܵ) − ݒ(ܴ)൯ + ൫ݒ(ܴ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݒ(ܴ)൯ 	
 = ݒோ( ଵܵ) + ݒோ(ܵଶ) (13) 
where the inequality follows from the convexity of ݒ. Hence, ݒோ is convex (and 
superadditive as well). 
Now, let ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊆ ܰ and ܴ = ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ. Suppose that for each ܴ ∈ 2ே, the game (ܰ\ܴ, ݒோ) is 
superadditive. If ܴ = ∅, then the game (ܰ\∅, ݒ∅) = (ܰ, ݒ) and ݒ(∅) = 0; hence, Γ is 
superadditive. If ܴ ≠ ∅, then because (ܰ\ܴ, ݒோ) is superadditive: 
 ݒோ(( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ)\ܴ) ≥ ݒோ( ଵܵ\ܴ) + ݒோ(ܵଶ\ܴ) 	
 ݒ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) − ݒ(ܴ) ≥ 	ݒ( ଵܵ) − ݒ(ܴ) + ݒ(ܵଶ) − ݒ(ܴ) 	
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 ݒ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) + ݒ(ܴ) ≥ 	ݒ( ଵܵ) + ݒ(ܵଶ)  
 ݒ( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ) + ݒ( ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ) ≥ 	ݒ( ଵܵ) + ݒ(ܵଶ) (14) 
This completes the proof. 
By using this characterization in the previous theorem and expanding it to our definition of 
a trust game, we can state a necessary requirement to produce a convex trust game: that the 
marginal trust synergy between any two coalitions must always result in a value that is at 
least as large as their marginal trust liability. 
 ݏோ(( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ)\ܴ) − ݈ோ(( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ)\ܴ) ≥ ݏோ( ଵܵ\ܴ) − ݈ோ( ଵܵ\ܴ) + ݏோ(ܵଶ\ܴ) − ݈ோ(ܵଶ\ܴ) 
 ሼ∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ: ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ܴሽ  
 ݏோ(( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ)\ܴ) − ݏோ( ଵܵ\ܴ) − ݏோ(ܵଶ\ܴ) ≥ ݈ோ(( ଵܵ ∪ ܵଶ)\ܴ) − ݈ோ( ଵܵ\ܴ) − ݈ோ(ܵଶ\ܴ) (15) 
  ሼ∀ ଵܵ, ܵଶ ⊂ ܰ: ଵܵ ∩ ܵଶ = ܴሽ  
3. Trust game model 
In the previous section, we characterized different classes of trust games without explicitly 
defining a trust game model. In this section, we provide a general model for trust games 
that conforms to the theoretical constructions in the previous section and can be adapted to 
a wide variety of applications. 
3.1. Modeling trust synergy and trust liability 
The attitude of trustworthiness agents have toward other agents in a trust game is managed 
in an |ܰ| × |ܰ| matrix ܶ. 
 ܶ = ൣݐ௜,௝൧|ே|×|ே| = ቊ ݐ௜,௝ = 1,ݐ௜,௝ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ,݅ = ݆݅ ≠ ݆ (16) 
This matrix is populated with values ݐ௜,௝ that represent the probability that agent ݆ is 
trustworthy from the perspective of agent ݅. The values ݐ௜,௝ can also be interpreted as the 
probabilities that agent ݅ will allow agent ݆ to interact with him, since rational agents would 
prefer to interact with more trustworthy agents. 
The manner in which ݐ௜,௝ is evaluated depends on an underlying trust model. We make no 
assumption about the use of a particular trust model, as the choice of an appropriate model 
may be application-specific. We also make no assumption about the spatial distribution of 
the agents in a game – therefore, this matrix should not necessarily imply the structure of a 
communications graph. 
We provide a general model for trust synergy and trust liability that can be adapted for a 
variety of applications. Our model makes use of a symmetric matrix Σ to manage potential 
trust synergy and a matrix Λ to manage potential trust liability. Σ is symmetric because we 
assume that agents mutually agree on the benefits of a synergetic interaction. 
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 Σ = ൣߪ௜,௝൧|ே|×|ே| = ൜ ߪ௜,௝ = 0,ߪ௜,௝ = ߪ௝,௜ ≥ 0,݅ = ݆݅ ≠ ݆ (17) 
 Λ = ൣߣ௜,௝൧|ே|×|ே| = ൜ߣ௜,௝ = 0,ߣ௜,௝ ≥ 0,݅ = ݆݅ ≠ ݆ (18) 
As with the ܶ matrix, we make no assumptions about how Σ and Λ are calculated, since the 
meaning of their values may depend on the application. For example, the calculations for ߪ௜,௝ and ߣ௜,௝ between two agents may not only take into account each agent’s individual 
intrinsic attributes – it may also factor in externalities (i.e. political climate, weather 
conditions, pre-existing conditions, etc.) that neither agent has direct control over. 
Definition: The total value of the trust synergy in a coalition is defined as the following set 
function: 
 ݏ(ܵ) = ∑ ߪ௜,௝௜,௝∈ௌ ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ 	∀݅ > ݆ (19) 
Trust synergy is the value obtained by agents in a coalition as a result of being able to work 
together due to their attitudes of trust for each other. The set function ݏ(ܵ) assumes that the 
events “agent ݅ allows agent ݆ to interact” and “agent ݆ allows agent ݅ to interact” are 
independent. This is reasonable since agents are assumed to behave as independent entities 
within a trust game (i.e. no agent is controlled by any other agent). Therefore, we treat the 
product ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ as the relative strength of a trust-based synergetic interaction, which justifies 
the use of the summation. The value for ߪ௜,௝ serves as a weight for a trust-based synergetic 
interaction. 
Definition: The total value of the trust liability in a coalition is defined as the following set 
function: 
 ݈(ܵ) = ∑ ߣ௜,௝ݐ௜,௝௜,௝∈ௌ 	∀݅ ≠ ݆ (20) 
Trust liability can be thought of as the vulnerability that agents in a coalition expose 
themselves to due to their attitudes of trust for each other. We treat the product ߣ௜,௝ݐ௜,௝ as a 
measure for agent ݅’s exposure to unfavorable trust-based interactions from agent ݆. A high 
amount of trust can expose agents to high levels of vulnerability. But each agent can 
regulate its exposure to trust liability by adjusting ݐ௜,௝. Changes to ݐ௜,௝, however, also 
influence the benefits of trust synergy. 
3.2. Modeling the trust game 
We define the trust game (also known as the total value of the trust payoff in a coalition) as 
the difference between its trust synergy and trust liability. 
 ݒ(ܵ) = ∑ ߪ௜,௝௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜வ௝ ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ − ∑ ߣ௜,௝ݐ௜,௝௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜ஷ௝  (21)	
 ݒ(ܵ) = ∑ ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ ൬ߪ௜,௝ − ఒ೔,ೕ௧ೕ,೔ − ఒೕ,೔௧೔,ೕ൰௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜வ௝   
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The factorization shows us that the first factor (ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜) will always be greater than or equal to 
zero while the second factor can be either positive or negative. Hence, by isolating the 
second factor and recognizing that trust values equal to 1 produce the smallest possible 
reduction in the second factor, we can state the condition that guarantees the potential for 
two agents to form a trust-based pair coalition. 
Proposition 1: Any two agents ݅, ݆ ∈ ܰ will never form a trust-based pair coalition if ߪ௜,௝ < ߣ௜,௝ + ߣ௝,௜. Otherwise, the potential exists for agent ݅ and ݆ to form a trust-based pair 
coalition. 
Proposition 2: If two agents can never form a trust-based pair coalition, then the best 
strategy for both agents is to never trust each other (i.e. ݐ௜,௝ = ݐ௝,௜ = 0). 
In general, proposition 1 does not extend to trust-based coalitions larger than two due to the 
complex coupling of trust dynamics between different agents as coalitions grow larger. For 
example, two agents who may produce a negative trust payoff value as a pair may actually 
realize a positive trust payoff with the addition of a third agent. This situation occurs if both 
agents have positive trust relationships with the third agent that outweighs their own 
negative trust relationship. Such a situation is common in real world scenarios, and justifies 
the importance of various trusted third parties, such as escrow companies, website 
authentication services, and couples therapists. 
In light of this, we can mathematically justify a condition similar to proposition 1 that is 
valid for coalitions of any size – but only for a special type of trust game. 
Theorem: A trust-based coalition ܵ ⊆ ܰ will never form if: 
 ∑ ߪ௜,௝௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜வ௝ < ∑ ఒ೔,ೕ௧ೕ,೔௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜ஷ௝  (22) 
 ൛∀݅, ݆ ∈ ܵ: ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ = ݇ൟ  
Proof: Let ܵ ⊆ ܰ and ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ = ݇ for all ݅, ݆ ∈ ܵ. Then, by substituting ݇ into the trust model: 
 ݒ(ܵ) = ∑ ߪ௜,௝௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜வ௝ ݇ − ∑ ఒ೔,ೕ௧ೕ,೔ ݇௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜ஷ௝  (23)	
 ݒ(ܵ) = ݇ ቆ∑ ߪ௜,௝௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜வ௝ − ∑ ఒ೔,ೕ௧ೕ,೔௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜ஷ௝ ቇ  
Because ݇ is a constant that is always greater than or equal to zero, we can clearly see that 
the second factor affects whether or not ݒ(ܵ) is positive or negative. Hence, if the second 
term in the second factor is larger than the first term in the second factor, then a coalition ܵ 
will never form. This completes the proof. 
3.3. Incorporating context into a trust game 
In practice, trust is often defined relative to some context. Context allows individuals to 
simplify complex decision-making scenarios by focusing on more narrow perspectives of 
situations or others, avoiding the potential for inconvenient paradoxes. 
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Coalitional trust games can also be defined relative to different contexts using the multi-
issue representation [7], where we use the words “context” and “issue” interchangeably. 
Definition: A multi-issue representation is composed of a collection of coalitional games, 
each known as an issue, ( ଵܰ, ݒଵ), ( ଶܰ, ݒଶ),⋯ , ( ௞ܰ, ݒ௞), which together constitute the 
coalitional game (ܰ, ݒ) where 
 ܰ = ଵܰ ∪ ଶܰ ∪⋯∪ ௞ܰ 
 For each coalition ܵ ⊆ ܰ, ݒ(ܵ) = ∑ ݒ௜(ܵ ∩ ௜ܰ)௞௜ୀଵ  
This approach allows us to define an arbitrarily complex trust game that can be easily 
decomposed into simpler trust games relative to a particular context. A set of agents in one 
context can overlap partially or complete with another set of agents in another context. And 
one can choose to treat the coalitional game in one big context, or the union of any number 
of contexts based on some decision criteria. 
3.4. Altruistic and competitive contribution decomposition 
In the analysis of a trust-based coalition, it may sometimes be useful to understand the 
manner in which different subsets of a coalition contribute to its payoff value. One way to 
do this is to use a framework developed by Arney and Peterson where measures of 
cooperation are defined in terms of altruistic and competitive cooperation [8]. The unifying 
concept in the framework is a subset team game, a situation or scenario in which the value of a 
given outcome (as perceived by a team subset) can be measured. 
Definition: Given a game Γ = (ܰ, ݑ) and a non-empty coalition	ܴ ⊆ ܵ ⊆ ܰ, the subset team 
game ݑோ: 2ோ → ℝ associates a valued payoff ݑோ(ܵ) perceived by the agents in ܴ when the 
agents in ܵ cooperate. 
The authors limit the application of the framework to games where more agents in a 
coalition lead to more successful outcomes. Thus, adding more agents to a coalition should 
never reduce the coalition’s payoff value. Also, the payoff value perceived by a coalition 
should not be smaller than the payoff value perceived by a subset of the same coalition. We 
refer to these two properties as fully-cooperative and cohesive, respectively. 
Definition: A subset team game is fully-cooperative if ݑ஺(ܤ) ≤ ݑ஺(ܥ) for all ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ. 
Definition: A subset team game is cohesive if ݑ஺(ܥ) ≤ ݑ஻(ܥ) for all ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ. 
The authors show that in a fully-cooperative and cohesive game, the marginal contribution 
of a subset team is equal to the sum of the competitive and altruistic contributions of the 
subset team. 
Definition: Given a payoff function ݑோ(ܵ) in a subset team game, the total marginal 
contribution of ܴ ⊆ ܵ to a team ܵ is ݉ோ(ܵ) = ݑௌ(ܵ) − ݑௌ\ோ(ܵ\ܴ). If the game is both cohesive 
and fully-cooperative, then the competitive contribution of ܴ is ܿோ(ܵ) = ݑௌ(ܵ) − ݑௌ\ோ(ܵ) and 
 
Cooperative Trust Games 243 
the altruistic contribution is ܽோ(ܵ) = ݑௌ\ோ(ܵ) − ݑௌ\ோ(ܵ\ܴ). Note that the total marginal 
contribution decomposes as ݉ோ(ܵ) = ܿோ(ܵ) + ܽோ(ܵ). 
In order to use these definitions within a trust game, we must first show they relate to the 
coalition game classes described in Section 3. 
Theorem: A subset team game that is both fully-cooperative and cohesive is a convex game. 
Proof: 
First, we prove the fully-cooperative case. If ݑ஺(ܤ) ≤ ݑ஺(ܥ) such that ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ, then 
following inequalities are also true: 
 
 ݑ஺(ܤ) ≤ ݑ஺(ܤ ∪ ݅)       ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܰ\݅ (24) 
 ݑ஺(ܥ) ≤ ݑ஺(ܥ ∪ ݅)      ܣ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ\݅ (25) 
 ݑ஺(ܤ ∪ ݅) ≤ ݑ஺(ܥ ∪ ݅)       ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ\݅ (26) 
Since the system of inequalities shows that the contribution of an additional agent in a 
coalition is always non-decreasing, it is trivially true that: 
 ݑ஺(ܤ ∪ ݅) − ݑ஺(ܤ) ≤ ݑ஺(ܥ ∪ ݅) − ݑ஺(ܥ)	ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ\݅ (27) 
Next, we prove the cohesive case. If ݑ஺(ܥ) ≤ ݑ஻(ܥ) such that ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ, then following 
inequalities are also true: 
 
 ݑ஺(ܥ) ≤ ݑ஺∪௜(ܥ)        ܣ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ\݅ (28) 
 ݑ஻(ܥ) ≤ ݑ஻∪௜(ܥ)      ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ\݅ (29) 
 ݑ஺∪௜(ܥ) ≤ ݑ஻∪௜(ܥ)     ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ\݅` (30) 
Since the system of inequalities show that the contribution of an additional agent in the 
accessing coalition subset is always non-decreasing, it is trivially true that: 
 ݑ஺∪௜(ܥ) − ݑ஺(ܥ) ≤ ݑ஻∪௜(ܥ) − ݑ஻(ܥ)	ܣ ⊆ ܤ ⊆ ܥ ⊆ ܰ\݅ (31) 
This completes the proof. 
It is important to note that the additional agent ݅ for both cases is never already inside either 
coalition ܤ or ܥ. If it was, then the proof would be invalid, as one could easily demonstrate 
counter examples under cases where an agent ݅ ∈ ܥ\ܤ. 
Now that we have shown that a convex subset team game is fully-cooperative and cohesive, 
we may decompose the total marginal contribution of a set of agents into both altruistic and 
competitive contributions whenever a trust game is convex. To do so, we must define a 
value function ݑோ(ܵ) that utilizes the trust game payoff value function ݒ(ܵ). 
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Definition: Given a game Γ = (ܰ, ݑ) and a non-empty coalition	ܴ ⊆ ܵ ⊆ ܰ, the subset trust 
game ݑோ: 2ோ → ℝ associates a trust payoff value ݑோ(ܵ) perceived by the agents in ܴ when the 
agents in ܵ cooperate: 
 ݑோ(ܵ) = ݒ(ܴ) + ∑ ݒ(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ)௜∈ோ,௝∈ௌ\ோ 	ܴ ⊆ ܵ ⊆ ܰ (32) 
The rationale behind this payoff function in is that the payoff has to be from the perspective 
of the agents in ܴ. The agents in ܴ can factor in the values related to relationships between 
themselves (first term) and relationships between agents in ܴ and agents in ܵ (second term). 
But they cannot factor in values related to relationships between the agents in ܵ\ܴ, since 
agents in ܴ are assumed to have no direct knowledge of what is happening between the ܵ\ܴ	agents. 
Using the payoff function ݑோ(ܵ), we can calculate ܴ’s altruistic contribution ܽோ(ܵ) and 
competitive contribution ܿோ(ܵ) in a coalition ܵ. 
 ܽோ(ܵ) = ∑ ݒ(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ)௜∈ோ,௝∈ௌ\ோ 	ܴ ⊆ ܵ ⊆ ܰ (33) 
 ܿோ(ܵ) = ݒ(ܵ) − ݒ(ܵ\ܴ) − ∑ ݒ(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ)௜∈ோ,௝∈ௌ\ோ 	ܴ ⊆ ܵ ⊆ ܰ (34) 
 ݉ோ(ܵ) = ܽோ(ܵ) + ܿோ(ܵ) = ݒ(ܵ) − ݒ(ܵ\ܴ)	ܴ ⊆ ܵ ⊆ ܰ (35) 
4. Convoy trust game 
In this section, we present an example of cooperative trust for a specific application: the 
convoy. Our primary purpose here is to demonstrate how one could use the theory in this 
chapter to model specific scenarios involving trust. We define the convoy trust game, which 
describes a cooperative game where the agents intend to move forward together in a single 
file. This type of game can be naturally adapted to the analysis of traffic patterns, leader-
follower applications, hierarchical organizations, or applications with sequential 
dependencies. Our goal in this section is to understand how trust-based coalitions will form 
under this type of scenario. 
4.1. 4-Agent convoy case 
We begin with a simple convoy scenario that models a four-agent convoy, ܰ = ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ, 
which intends to move together in a single file. The value of each index into ܰ represents the 
agent’s position in the convoy. For this scenario, we interpret the trust synergy in the 
coalition to represent the agents in the coalition moving forward. Thus, we set the values in 
the trust synergy matrix Σ equal to the number of agents that will move forward if the two 
agents are moving forward (inclusive of the two agents). We interpret the trust liability in 
coalition to represent the vulnerability of agents in the coalition to stop moving. Thus, we 
set the values in the trust liability matrix Λ equal to the number of agents that can prevent a 
particular agent from moving forward in a agent coalition pair. 
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Definition: The values in Σ and Λ for a 4-convoy trust game are: 
Σ = ൦0 2 3 42 0 3 43 3 0 44 4 4 0	൪ 	Λ = ൦
0 0 0 01 0 1 12 2 0 23 3 3 0൪ 
4.2. 4-Agent convoy trust game analysis 
First, let us analyze this game as an additive trust game. While there are infinitely many 
solutions for ܶ that conform to the additive game, the most obvious solution is the extreme 
situation where no agent trusts any other agent – or, when ܶ is the identity matrix (ܶ = ܫ). In 
this case, no agent will ever affect another agent, either positively or negatively. Thus, each 
agent will ultimately form a singleton coalition and fail to work cooperatively with any 
other agent. 
Next, let us analyze another extreme situation where every agent completely trusts every 
other agent – or, when ܶ = ሾ1ሿସ×ସ. As such, we can enumerate the trust payoff values for 
each possible coalition. ݒ(ሼ1,2ሽ) = 1; 	ݒ(ሼ1,3ሽ) = 1; ݒ(ሼ1,4ሽ) = 1; 	ݒ(ሼ2,3ሽ) = 0; 	ݒ(ሼ2,4ሽ) = 0; ݒ(ሼ3,4ሽ) = −1; 	ݒ(ሼ1,2,3ሽ) = 2; 	ݒ(ሼ1,2,4ሽ) = 2; 	ݒ(ሼ1,3,4ሽ) = 1; ݒ(ሼ2,3,4ሽ) = −1; 	ݒ(ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ) = 2; 
These results provide us an interesting insight, in that all agents behind the lead agent find 
higher values of trust payoff with the lead agent than with the nearest agent. As such, as 
long as the lead agent is a member of a trust-based coalition in this game, there will be no 
incentive for any other agent to abandon the coalition. Thus, the agents ultimately form the 
grand coalition. Note, however, that the formation of a grand coalition does not imply that 
the trust game is superadditive or convex. This assertion is justified with the observation 
that ݒ(ሼ3,4ሽ) ≱ ݒ(ሼ3ሽ) + ݒ(ሼ4ሽ) = 0. 
In order to form a convex 4-convoy trust game, we must satisfy the conditions that ensure 
that all trust payoff values in any coalition are at least as large as any sub-coalition – or that 
the marginal trust synergy is always greater than or equal to the marginal trust liability. 
While, again, there are infinitely many solutions for ܶ that conform to convex game, the 
games with the highest trust payoff actually have either one of the following trust matrices 
(see next section for proof): 
ଵܶ = ൦1 1 1 11 1 0 01 0 1 01 0 0 1	൪	 ଶܶ = ൦
1 1 1 11 1 0 11 0 1 01 1 0 1	൪	 ଷܶ = ൦
1 1 1 11 1 1 01 1 1 01 0 0 1	൪	 ସܶ = ൦
1 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 01 1 0 1	൪ ଵܶ, ଶܶ, ଷܶ, and ସܶ are modified versions of ሾ1ሿସ×ସ and all produce the same results in the trust 
payoff value function. The main modification ensures that agents 3 and 4 have no trust 
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toward each other since the sum of their individual trust liabilities always outweigh the 
trust synergy they create. The following is the enumeration of the trust payoff values for the 
4-convoy trust game with the highest trust payoff: 
 ݒ(ሼ1,2ሽ) = 1; 	ݒ(ሼ1,3ሽ) = 1; ݒ(ሼ1,4ሽ) = 1; 	ݒ(ሼ2,3ሽ) = 0; 	ݒ(ሼ2,4ሽ) = 0; ݒ(ሼ3,4ሽ) = 0; ݒ(ሼ1,2,3ሽ) = 2; 	ݒ(ሼ1,2,4ሽ) = 2; 	ݒ(ሼ1,3,4ሽ) = 2; ݒ(ሼ2,3,4ሽ) = 0; 	ݒ(ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ) = 3; 
The deep insight we gain from analyzing optimal trust matrices and payoff value results is 
that all agents behind the lead agent need only trust the lead agent in the convoy to move 
forward, provided the lead agent trusts every other agent to follow it. This echoes the 
intuition seen in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s classic “stag hunt” game, where there is no 
incentive for any player to cheat by not cooperating as long as each player can trust others to 
do the same [9]. 
We can use anecdotal evidence found in our experiences in automobile traffic jams to verify 
our understanding of the theoretical result. Drivers in traffic lanes (coalitional convoys) 
rarely place a significant amount of trust in neighboring drivers to justify the value of the 
traffic lane (as the model corroborates). In fact, in the event a driver becomes stuck in a 
traffic jam, he likely will not feel betrayed by the driver directly in front. Instead, he will 
unconsciously begin gauging the coalitional value of the traffic jam by considering his level 
of trust in the lead driver in the traffic jam, whether in visible range or not. In most cases, the 
driver monitors the traffic flow or listens to traffic reports to gauge his trust for the lead 
driver. He may also unconsciously consider other drivers in the traffic jam and estimate 
their trust perceptions of the traffic jam to gauge the coalition’s value. In the event a driver 
cannot accurately gauge the value of the traffic jam, he may choose to leave the traffic jam 
and attempt to join another traffic coalition (lane) with a higher payoff value. These types of 
driver behaviors are generally not performed when the trust for the lead driver to move 
forward is high. Yet, these behaviors feel necessary when the trust lessens since they attempt 
to resolve coalitional and environmental uncertainties. 
4.3. N-Agent convoy optimal solution proof 
We conclude by generalizing the convoy trust game for any number of agents and prove the 
solution for the highest payoff trust-based coalition. Our proof shows that all agents behind 
the lead agent in a convoy need only trust the lead agent, and no other agent, to move 
forward so long as the lead agent trusts every other agent to follow it. 
Definition: The generalized values in Σ and Λ for a convoy trust game with |ܰ| agents are: 
 Σ = ൣߪ௜,௝൧|ே|×|ே| = ቊ 	ߪ௜,௝ = 0, ݅ = ݆ߪ௜,௝ = max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) , ݅ ≠ ݆ (36) 
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 Λ = ൣߣ௜,௝൧|ே|×|ே| = ൜ ߣ௜,௝ = 0,ߣ௜,௝ = ݅ − 1,݅ = ݆݅ ≠ ݆ (37) 
Theorem: The convoy trust game that produces the grand coalition with highest payoff 
value has a trust matrix that conforms to the following construction: 
 ܶ = ൣݐ௜,௝൧|ே|×|ே| = ۖەۖ۔
ۓ ݐ௜,௝ = 1, ݅ = ݆	ݐ௜,௝ = 1, ݅ ≠ ݆,min(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = 1ݐ௜,௝ = ݐ௝,௜ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ, ݅ ≠ ݆,min(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = 2ݐ௜,௝ = 0, ݅ ≠ ݆,min(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) > 2	  (38) 
Proof: 
Suppose we generalize the values in Σ and Λ. According to proposition 1, two agents ݅, ݆ ∈ ܰ 
will never form a trust-based coalition pair if ߪ௜,௝ < ߣ௜,௝ + ߣ௝,௜. Thus, by substitution: 
 max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) < (݅ − 1) + (݆ − 1) 
 max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) < ݅ + ݆ − 2 (39) 
We see that if ݅ is the maximum value, then 0 < ݆ − 2. Similarly, if ݆ is the maximum value, 
then 0 < ݅ − 2. Thus, the inequalities tell us that any agent behind the second agent will 
never form a trust-based coalition with any other agent behind the second agent. Therefore, 
by proposition 2, the best strategy for these agents is to have no trust for each other; hence ݐ௜,௝ = 0 when min(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) > 2 for ݅ ≠ ݆. 
The equalities above alsto tell us that a trust-based coalition formation is possible with the 
lead agent and the second agent. Using the definition of the trust game model, the trust 
payoff values for a coalition in the convoy trust game is: 
 ݒ(ܵ) = ∑ ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ ൬max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) − ௜ିଵ௧ೕ,೔ − ௝ିଵ௧೔,ೕ ൰௜,௝∈ௌ∀௜வ௝  (40) 
We may now define the trust payoff values for any pair of agents as: 
 ݒ(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = ݐ௜,௝ݐ௝,௜ ൬max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) − ௜ିଵ௧ೕ,೔ − ௝ିଵ௧೔,ೕ ൰ (41) 
Let us first analyze coalition formation with the lead agent. If ݅ = 1, then max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = ݆. 
Therefore, the payoff value for a pair coalition between ݅ and ݆ is: ݒ(ሼ1, ݆ሽ) = ݐଵ,௝ݐ௝,ଵ ቆ݆ − ݆ − 1ݐଵ,௝ ቇ ݒ(ሼ1, ݆ሽ) = ݆ݐଵ,௝ݐ௝,ଵ − ݆ݐ௝,ଵ + ݐ௝,ଵ 
 
 ݒ(ሼ1, ݆ሽ) = ݐ௝,ଵ൫݆ݐଵ,௝ − ݆ + 1൯ (42) 
 
Game Theory Relaunched 248 
By inspection, we see that the highest trust payoff value is achieved when both the lead 
agent and any other agent completely trust each other (i.e., when ݐଵ,௝ = ݐ௝,ଵ = 1). However, 
to justify this assertion, we must also show this is true when ݆ = 1. If ݆ = 1, then max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) =݅. Therefore, the payoff value for a pair coalition between ݅ and ݆ is: 
 ݒ(ሼ݅, 1ሽ) = ݐ௜,ଵݐଵ,௜ ቆ݅ − ݅ − 1ݐଵ,௜ ቇ ݒ(ሼ݅, 1ሽ) = ݅ݐ௜,ଵݐଵ,௜ − ݅ݐ௜,ଵ + ݐ௜,ଵ 
 ݒ(ሼ݅, 1ሽ) = ݐ௜,ଵ൫݅ݐଵ,௜ − ݅ + 1൯ (43) 
 
Again, by inspection, we confirm that the highest trust payoff is achieved when both the 
lead agent and any other agent completely trust each other. Therefore, ݐ௜,௝ = 1 when the min(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = 1 for ݅ ≠ ݆. 
Now, we analyze coalition formation with the second agent. If ݅ = 2, then max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = ݆. 
Therefore, the payoff value for a pair coalition between ݅ and ݆ is: 
 ݒ(ሼ2, ݆ሽ) = ݐଶ,௝ݐ௝,ଶ ቆ݆ − 1ݐ௝,ଶ − ݆ − 1ݐଶ,௝ ቇ ݒ(ሼ2, ݆ሽ) = ݐଶ,௝ݐ௝,ଶ݆ − ݐଶ,௝ − ݆ݐ௝,ଶ + ݐ௝,ଶ 
 ݒ(ሼ2, ݆ሽ) = ݐ௝,ଶ൫݆ݐଶ,௝ − ݆ + 1൯ − ݐଶ,௝ (44) 
 
The highest trust payoff that can be achieved with the second agent is equal to zero, and this 
only occurs when both agents either have complete trust in each other (i.e., when ݐଶ,௝ =ݐ௝,ଶ = 1) or no trust in each other (i.e., when ݐଶ,௝ = ݐ௝,ଶ = 0). Any other combination of trust 
values will produce negative trust payoff values. However, to justify this assertion, we must 
also show this is true when ݆ = 2. If ݆ = 2, then max(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = ݅. Therefore, the payoff value 
for a pair coalition between ݅ and ݆ is: 
 ݒ(ሼ݅, 2ሽ) = ݐ௜,ଶݐଶ,௜ ቆ݅ − ݅ − 1ݐଶ,௜ − 1ݐ௜,ଶቇ ݒ(ሼ݅, 2ሽ) = ݅ݐ௜,ଶݐଶ,௜ − ݅ݐ௜,ଶ + ݐ௜,ଶ − ݐଶ,௜ 
 ݒ(ሼ݅, 2ሽ) = ݐ௜,ଶ൫݅ݐଶ,௜ − ݅ + 1൯ − ݐଶ,௜ (45) 
 
By inspection, we confirm that the highest trust payoff that can be achieved with the second 
agent is equal to zero. Therefore, ݐ௜,௝ = ݐ௝,௜ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ when min(ሼ݅, ݆ሽ) = 2 for ݅ ≠ ݆. 
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To complete the proof, we simply state our assumption that each agent fully trusts itself, 
since it is impossible for an agent to diverge from a singleton coalition. Therefore, ݐ௜,௝ = 1 
when ݅ = ݆. This completes the proof. 
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